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	 	 Abstract
For effective enforcement of its law the EU is to a large extent 
dependent on the enforcement efforts of the member states. The member states are 
responsible for the correct and timely application of EU treaties and secondary 
EU legislation. This dependence is an important reason for the European legisla-
tor and European courts to increasingly guide national enforcement. Interesting 
questions result from this guidance. What exactly is the relationship between EU 
legislation in the area of law enforcement and national policy and legislation in 
this respect? How is that legislation implemented, and can patterns be recognized 
in this? What problems are the national legislator and the national enforcement 
practice and organisation faced with in this respect? These questions have been 
dealt with in respect to the Netherlands in a research project carried out in 2006 
and 2007 by researchers of Leiden University and Utrecht University. The project 
was commissioned by the Dutch Justice Ministry’s Research and Documentation 
Centre. This article presents the main results of this research into the implementa-
tion of EU enforcement provisions in the Netherlands. 
	 1	 	Greater	Community	Control	of	National	
Enforcement?
On the 3th of September 2005 the EC Court of Justice (ECJ) 
gave a ruling on the competence of the Community legislature, which has 
been the subject of much discussion. The Court arrived at the conclusion 
that it is possible to include in an EC directive provisions which prescribe 
measures that relate to the criminal law of the Member States for an effec-
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tive enforcement of EC environmental law.2 The ruling of the Court is of 
course interesting for the consequences it – possibly – has for the autonomy 
of national criminal law. But the ruling is also interesting for other, less 
conspicuous reasons. The obligation to impose penal sanctions on breach of 
Community provisions fits into the new strategy of the EU legislator to take 
action on the effective enforcement of EU legislation. It would appear that 
the EU will become more involved in the enforcement of EU law in order to 
tackle in this way the growing enforcement deficit,3 and that it will do so by 
further limiting the national autonomy. But is that indeed the case? 
In 2006 and 2007 research into that question, commissioned by the 
Research and Documentation Centre of the Dutch Ministry of Justice, was 
carried out by a large group of researchers from Utrecht University and 
Leiden University. In various domains and in various regulations it was 
examined whether there is more intensive EU control of enforcement as 
evidenced by the enforcement provisions. The Dutch reaction to these kind 
of provisions was also examined: how are these provisions received and 
implemented? In this article we will pay attention to the set-up and results 
of this research. After an introduction to the set-up, the supervision and 
enforcement of EU provisions in general will then be discussed. Subse-
quently, we will deal with the question of how the research was carried out, 
as well as detailing the results of a number of case studies in a few policy 
areas. The article ends with the general findings of the research, and the 
conclusions which may be attached to them. Given the general nature of this 
article, it should be noted that reference will often be made to the full report 
of our research for further details or more in-depth reasoning.5 
	 2	 	Research	into	EU	Enforcement	Strategies	and	
Enforcement	Provisions
The aim of the research was essentially twofold. The 
research group was asked to explore in greater detail how Europe guides 
the national enforcement of EU law provisions and to analyse – on that 
basis – how enforcement provisions in EU law (in particular legislation 
from the first (EC law) pillar of the EU and from the third pillar in respect 
of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters) are implemented in 
2  Case C-76/03 Commission v. Council [2005] ECR I-7875. 
3  W. Voermans, ‘De communautarisering van toezicht en handhaving’, in: T. Barkhuysen, W. 
den Ouden & J.E.M. Polak (eds.), Recht realiseren; bijdragen rond het thema adequate naleving 
van rechtsregels (Deventer 2005), p. 79-8 and p. 85 and 86.
  G.J.M. Corstens, ‘Het einde van het nationale strafrecht’ [2003] NJB, p. 29-30 and by 
the same author, his earlier ‘Communautarisering van het strafrecht’ [2003] NJB, p. 66. 
5  P.C. Adriaanse et al., Implementatie van EU-handhavingsvoorschriften (The Hague 2008).
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the Netherlands. In this respect, it should also be examined in particular 
whether certain regularities or patterns can be observed in the way in which 
the Netherlands implements (via legal measures or actual action by policy 
makers or enforcing bodies) EU enforcement provisions (originating from 
legal acts and case-law), and whether this implementation involves problems 
and issues which might provide a basis for adjusting the current method of 
implementation. 
In order to obtain a good, representative picture we have looked at EU 
enforcement provisions and related arrangements in various policy areas. 
While doing so we have worked according to a multi-stage programme. For 
selecting the policy areas, first a so-called quick scan in twelve policy areas 
has been carried out.6 By subsequently analysing the results of the quick 
scans for each policy area and constructing a scale for this, it was possible to 
arrive at a score of the European influence on national enforcement. Subse-
quently this score has been combined with a score allocated to each policy 
area for the degree of Europeanization of the substantive rules. On the basis 
of these overall scores we obtained a picture of the presumed intensity of 
the Europeanization of the law enforcement in the various policy areas.7 In 
this way we were able to eventually distinguish four categories of intensity, 
varying from a low to a high degree of presumed intensity of the Europe-
anization of the law enforcement. Subsequently, for each category we have 
selected two policy areas which have been dealt with in greater detail (more 
in-depth case studies). Increasing from light to high intensity of Europeani-
zation, more detailed research has been carried out in the following areas: I) 
media policy and combating terrorism; II) air quality and financial supervi-
sion; III) European Social Fund (ESF) and European competition; and IV) 
fish quota policy and customs. In those more in-depth case studies we have 
also paid attention to the situation in practice. The research in these case 
studies has been carried out on the basis of analysing implementation files, 
case law and literature and by holding interviews with key persons at legisla-
tive, policy and execution level.8 
6  The twelve policy areas are: customs, fish quota policy, ESF (protection of the financial 
interests of the Community), financial supervision, European competition, food safety, 
combating terrorism (harmonisation of substantive criminal law), working conditions, air 
quality, waste transport, media policy (broadcasting corporations) and quality of medical 
services.
7  In this research Europeanization is understood to be a development within the integrated 
European legal system whereby the national enforcement, including also the general 
doctrines of the law, is determined sometimes to a greater extent and sometimes to a lesser 
extent by European law.
8  For more details about that research method see the final report P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. 
cit., p. 7-28.
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	 3	 Enforcement	of	EU	Provisions
How does the EU actually enforce its legislation? If we 
look at the rules contained in the treaties, the member states are primarily 
responsible for the observance of Community rules. The European Com-
mission has a general task (Article 2 EC Treaty) to supervise that Com-
munity law is enforced by the member states. The Commission carries out 
this task, for instance, by initiating infringement proceedings or by carrying 
out conformity checks. The Commission itself has few first-line monitoring 
tasks in this respect (i.e. itself carrying out inspections and enforcement in 
the member states). An important part of the supervisory task of the Com-
mission shows more resemblance with – what in the Netherlands is called 
– administrative supervision than with the (direct) supervision of the obser-
vance of Community law. In the field of competition law the Commission 
actually has independent enforcement powers. Sometimes the supervision 
of the Commission is carried out by special agencies. 
In recent years it is becoming increasingly clear that an enforcement defi-
cit arises in the compliance with EU provisions. This is dealt with in various 
ways.9 For instance, more intensive checks are carried out, the implemen-
tation of the rules is better prepared and better coordinated, more strict 
enforcement systems are designed (with more severe punishments), new 
institutions are set up (e.g. agencies), and a better monitoring of the compli-
ance is aimed at.0
Whatever the merits of the new strategies may be – we will discuss this 
in greater detail later –, our research shows that, apart from exceptions such 
as competition law (which is by now also already partly decentralised), EU 
law is still mainly indirectly enforced. That is to say it is enforced primarily 
by the member states. In an increasing number of policy areas the Euro-
pean institutions establish uniform or harmonising rules for such enforce-
ment which are incorporated directly into the national legal systems or via 
member state intervention. For EU law to have any effect the member states 
must implement these European rules. For an effective enforcement of its 
9  For the Commission approach in the years to come see the Communication from the Euro-
pean Commission from 2007 A Europe of results – applying Community law (COM(2007) 502 
final). As regards its own role, the Commission puts its efforts in prevention by: a) more 
attention for implementation (in a broad sense) at the drafting of legislation; b) reacting 
efficiently and effectively to complaints from citizens and enterprises; c) improving working 
methods, e.g. by giving priority to infringement proceedings, and d) more dialogue and 
transparency, between member states and institutions, but also to the public.
0  Even the European Parliament expressly wants a role in the supervision of the compliance. 
See the Frassoni report about the 23d annual report of the Commission on monitoring the 
application of Community law (2005), 23 November 2007, A6-062/2007.
  In this research – as in the guide used by the Dutch national legislator ‘0 Praktijkvragen 
voor de implementatie van EG-besluiten’ – implementation is understood to mean: the legal 
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law the European Union is to a large extent dependent on the enforcement 
efforts of the member states. This dependence is an important reason for the 
European legislator and European courts to guide national enforcement. 
	 4	 	European	Influence	in	the	Area	of	Law	
Enforcement
The European influence in the area of law enforcement has 
two motives, and with it two sides. On the one hand, for an effective enforce-
ment it is necessary to steer the enforcement in the member states in a 
vertical direction. That means that the EU legislator, EU courts (EC Court of 
First Instance and EC Court of Justice) and the European Commission make 
efforts to ensure the compliance with EU rules by influencing actors in an 
individual member state via enforcement provisions, case law and efforts of 
monitoring and imposing sanctions. On the other hand, there also exists 
horizontal steering, from the necessity for enforcement cooperation between 
the member states as well as for facilitating the coordination of enforce-
ment efforts in the various member states. This type of steering occurs in 
particular in the combating of transnational infringements of European 
rules. After all, the infringement of EU rules does by no means always occur 
on the territory of a single member state. The European influence in the 
areas of enforcement is also intended, in particular, to prevent problems of 
a level playing field, which might rapidly arise without Europe influencing 
the enforcement cooperation and efforts. After all, (large) differences in the 
enforcement practice in different member states lead, just as differences in 
substantive rules, to unequal competition conditions for the parties involved. 
This problem has been observed in almost all policy areas examined. The 
most striking example was in the area of media policy, where a conflict arose 
between the Netherlands and Luxembourg in respect of the RTL group 
Netherlands, which has its registered office in Luxembourg and broadcasts 
in the Netherlands. Luxembourg satisfies the minimum requirements of the 
Television without Frontiers directive,2 while the Netherlands has stricter 
regulations. The consequence of this is that the RTL group evades the strict 
conversion or incorporation, the execution and actual enforcement of those rules. Within 
the framework of this research ‘enforcement’ is likewise broadly interpreted and refers to 
monitoring (supervision of the compliance as well as investigation of offences) and impos-
ing sanctions.
2  Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting 
activities (OJ 989, L 298/23), as amended by Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of 
certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities (OJ 997, L 202/60).
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Dutch regulations which competing commercial broadcasters with regis-
tered office in the Netherlands actually have to comply with. 3
The EU influences the enforcement of EU law in the first place by means 
of the legislative instruments from both the first (EC law) pillar of the EU 
and the third pillar in respect of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. In addition, there is influence in the form of case law. The EC Court 
of Justice establishes on the one hand instrumental requirements, such as 
the so-called principle of effectiveness, to be used by member states for 
the enforcement of European law or national law grafted on it. On the other 
hand guarantee requirements are also established in case law.5 
A third way of such influence by the EU is via soft law. It attempts to 
guide the process by formulating best practices, guidelines, benchmarks 
and standards, by holding peer evaluations and reviews, et cetera. This 
approach is strongly on the rise. All policy areas examined show that there 
exists a form of consultation between the member states themselves, or 
between the member states and the Commission. In most cases it has 
been specified in a directive, regulation or decision that a consultative body 
should be set up, such as the European Competition Network6 in the field 
of competition, the Community Fisheries Control Agency7 in the field of 
fish quota and the Committee of European Securities Regulators8 in the 
field of financial supervision. In addition, our research shows that either 
by themselves or together with the Commission, member states set up an 
informal network if no formal consultative body has been set up, or when 
they want an additional consultative body, such as the European Platform of 
Regulatory Authorities9 in the field of media and the European Competition 
Authorities20 in the field of competition. From this it follows that in the past 
years the EU relies ever more heavily on information strategy (in the follow-
ing: I-strategy) in combating the enforcement deficit in respect of European 
3  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 08.
  This principle has been formulated in the Greek maize case (Case 68/88 Commission v. 
Greece [989] ECR 2965) on the basis of the requirements of equivalence, proportionality, 
effectiveness and deterrence.
5  The guarantee requirements are on the one hand in line with the fundamental rights from 
the ECHR, and in addition the EU also has its own legal principles, such as the equality 
principle, the right to a fair hearing and the principle of proportionality.
6  Article  Regulation (EC) no. /2003 of the Council of 6 December 2002 on the imple-
mentation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 8 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 
2003, L /).
7  Regulation (EC) 768/2005 of the Council of 26 April 2005 establishing a Community Fish-
eries Control Agency and amending Regulation (EEC) no. 287/93 establishing a control 
system applicable to the common fisheries policy (OJ 2005, L 28/).
8  Decision 200/527/EC of 6 June 200 (OJ 200, L 9/3).
9  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. .
20  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 207.
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rules. The emphasis is on obtaining (as accurately as possible) information 
with respect to the compliance situation. The control methods identified for 
this, in which the Commission also participates, can be seen as parts of that 
I-strategy in promoting the compliance with EU provisions. In the way in 
which cooperation is effected at EU level (at regulatory level) and at national 
level (as noted above the member states are responsible for the execution of 
EU rules) information concerning the compliance in the member states is 
essential. That applies among other things, but not exclusively, for second-
line supervision.2 Without information there is no insight into the enforce-
ment deficit with respect to European rules, and neither is it possible to 
react. In view of this, member states will as a rule profit from embracing the 
I-strategy of the EU in the enforcement of and compliance with EU rules. 
This provides good chances for benchmarking and thus for arriving at a 
more effective and more efficient enforcement of EU rules. It may further 
prevent that the European level playing field will be undermined, and in this 
way it may also strengthen the transparency and dialogue with citizens and 
organisations involved.
The EU influence is exercised by steering various methods of law 
enforcement, varying from public law enforcement by means of administra-
tive and criminal law to forms of private law or private enforcement.22 As 
regards the private enforcement, EU enforcement provisions concern actions 
which citizens in particular may institute in order to enforce their entitle-
ments protected by the EU. They may do this before the national courts in 
relation to other citizens or the government. This private way of influenc-
ing the compliance with EU rules has not been exhaustively dealt with in 
our research. However, it actually plays an important role in the field of the 
European fish quota policy by the Biesheuvel groups23 and in the field of 
competition law.2
Examining in greater detail the interaction between the European 
requirements and the national public law enforcement, three matters in a 
general sense attract attention. 
Our research shows in the first place that in (policy or discussions about) 
EU enforcement provisions dogmatic distinctions, as often used in national 
2  Second-line supervision is understood to mean the monitoring of the monitoring activities 
of the member states by the Commission. This as distinguished from first-line supervision 
whereby the Commission acts directly in the member states in order to monitor the market 
participants. 
22  As regards the jargon used, the Dutch and the European doctrine are not fully in line. In 
respect of – what in the Netherlands is called – public law enforcement of EU enforcement 
provisions concern both the (monitoring) stage of the administrative supervision of compli-
ance and the criminal investigation, as well as the imposition of sanctions after observed 
infringements.
23  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 279.
2  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 22.
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law between criminal law and administrative law, are traditionally not 
taken into account. That applies in particular for the European Community 
(EC). This has partly to do with the fact that EC law often leaves it to the 
member states themselves whether they want to enforce certain matters by 
criminal law, civil law or administrative law. For another – possibly much 
more important – part the cause of this lies in the fact that the EC, as was 
assumed for a long time, had no power, or at its best a controversial power 
in the field of criminal (procedural) law. For that reason one actually comes 
across provisions which concern the relation with criminal (procedural) law, 
but without prescribing enforcement under criminal law. The case study on 
financial supervision provides an example of this, where it is provided that 
within that framework powers of seizure must actually be available, which 
in the Netherlands have generally been regulated through criminal law.25 In 
line with the above, it attracts in the second place attention that European 
enforcement provisions, at any rate in the policy areas examined, mostly 
emphasize the instrumental side of the law enforcement, directed at the way 
in which member state authorities and enforcement bodies must carry out 
enforcement. That is for instance apparent from provisions regarding fish 
quota and air quality which indicate how the monitoring must be carried 
out.26 The safeguard side (including the legal protection) gets much less 
attention. Reference to this side is often only made in case law.27 Therefore, 
when choosing between various enforcement methods, as well as in their 
implementation, more structural attention is asked for the associated legal 
safeguards and legal protection as well as for the implications for transpar-
ency, monitoring and democracy in the law enforcement. 
In the third place it is striking that in various areas the legislator on the 
European stage is over and again reinventing the (same) wheel as regards 
enforcement provisions, without this seeming to lead directly to mutual 
learning effects between the various European policy-fields. So, in other 
words, at the European level one operates in a policy-field dependent way. 
A more integrated, horizontal approach of the enforcement problem at EU 
level seems appropriate. At European level this has only very recently been 
started.28 The outcome of this development cannot be predicted.
25  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 5. 
26  Fisheries: Article 3 and 25 of Council Regulation (EC) no. 286/98 of 7 December 998 
amending Regulation (EEC) no. 287/93 establishing a control system applicable to the 
common fisheries policy (OJ L 358/5). Air quality: Articles -6 of Council Directive 96/62/
EC of 27 September 996 on ambient air quality assessment and management (OJ L 296/).
27  For the equality principle and the principle of proportionality see for instance Case C-29/95 
Pastoors and Trans-Cap [997] ECR I-285.
28  In the Netherlands that has been included as of 2007 via the amendment to the Competi-
tion Act. See Amendment to the Competition Act as a result of the evaluation of that Act. 
Parliamentary Papers II 200/05, no. 30 07.
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	 5	 	EU	Enforcement	Provisions	Viewed	From	the	
Pillar	Structure
In areas which are considered to belong to the first (EC 
law) pillar of the European Union law enforcement in the member states is 
mainly influenced through case law, legislation and policy. In our research 
we have also observed some forms of spontaneous or voluntary adjustment, 
harmonisation and coordination of enforcement efforts of member states. 
The recent introduction of the search powers of the Netherlands Competi-
tion Authority is a good example of this.29 
Our research shows that in the past fifteen years the influence within the 
first pillar by legislation and policy has clearly expanded. In this way Europe 
influences various parts of the national monitoring activities (in the Nether-
lands mainly consisting of compliance supervision and investigative activi-
ties). The precise influence on these parts differs for each policy area, but 
with the necessary provisos it may be stated that more European guidance in 
respect of the monitoring can be observed in policy areas in which substan-
tive rules have been more strongly Europeanised. This concerns areas such 
as European competition, on which provisions have been included in Regu-
lation (EC) /200330 which give the Commission the right to be informed 
and react when national competition authorities decide to initiate an inves-
tigation under Article 8 or 82 EC Treaty.3 In addition, this influence can 
also be noticed to an increasing degree in the field of the ESF, because the 
new Regulation (EC) 828/200632 contains much more detailed monitor-
ing provisions than its predecessor.33 Other examples are the case studies 
concerning fish quota policy3 and customs.35 
In addition to the monitoring activities, the influence by legislation and 
policy in the first pillar also concerns the (administrative and criminal) 
imposition of sanctions in the member states. The European legislator is 
however considerably more reticent in influencing what must happen after 
an infringement has been discovered. Member states usually have a rela-
tively large freedom in choosing for a criminal, administrative or private 
law system of imposing sanctions. Some developments seem to point in 
the direction of a decrease of this European restraint. In various areas an 
29  Parliamentary Papers II 200/05, 30 07, no. 3
30  Council Regulation (EC) no. /2003 of 6 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 8 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2003, L /).
3  Articles , 2, 3 and 5 of Regulation (EC) /2003 and P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 95.
32  Council Regulation (EC) 083/2006 of  June 2006 laying down general provisions on the 
European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund 
and repealing Regulation (EC) no. 260/999 (OJ 2006, L 2006/25).
33  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 226.
3  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 26.
35  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 300.
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increasing influence is expected as regards rules which set requirements for 
both the administrative and criminal imposition of sanctions. Section 5 of 
the Modernised Customs Code, for instance, concerns punitive sanctions.36 
Prescribing criminal sanctions in the first pillar is expected to be the next 
step. The ECJ ruling in case C-76/03 on environmental criminal law of the 
EC Court of Justice and the Commission’s reaction to it forms an indication 
of this, at least in the field of the environment where the EC Court of Justice 
linked the Community legislator’s power to prescribe measures connected 
with criminal law to the effective functioning of Community law.37 The 
Commission is of the opinion that it must also be possible to use this power 
outside the field of the environment, such as intellectual property, hiring 
illegal workers and discharge at sea. For the latter field this has by now been 
confirmed by the EC Court of Justice in the ruling on discharges at sea.38 
Whether this also applies for the other areas mentioned cannot yet be said 
with certainty. However, for the period and policy areas examined in our 
research it applies that on these grounds no actual shift to, or strengthening 
of criminal enforcement has been observed. 
In the third pillar the law enforcement is also influenced by Europe. In 
recent years all kinds of initiatives have been developed which – e.g. in the 
field of combating terrorism – intend to harmonise the criminal law of the 
member states as well as to bring both its substantive and procedural law 
into line. Here too the earlier mentioned I-strategy is clearly present. 
Nevertheless in the third pillar there is more room for the member states 
to shape their own enforcement practice than in the first pillar. Moreover 
the European institutions have actually less room to ensure compliance 
with framework decisions, in particular because there is no possibility to 
institute treaty infringement proceedings. In the Pupino ruling39 the EC 
Court of Justice has however opened the possibility for first-pillar elements 
to be introduced into the third pillar, in particular by making a comparison 
between the framework decision and the directive and by arriving at the 
opinion that by virtue of this comparison interpretation must be in conform-
ity with a framework decision which member states have to deal with. In 
light of this the EC Court of Justice will in all probability use the loyalty to 
the Union more often in the future in order to impose obligations on the 
member states in respect of the implementation and application of third 
pillar law. The instrumental requirements and safeguards developed in case 
law within the framework of the first pillar may start to play an important 
role in that respect.
36  Regulation (EC) no. 50/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2008 laying down the Community Customs Code (Modernised Customs Code) (OJ 2008, L 
5/).
37  Case C-76/03 Commission v. Council [2005] ECR I-7875.
38  Case C-0/05 Commission v. Council [2007] ECR I-9097.
39  Case C-05/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285.
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But it must be noted here that the influencing of the national law enforce-
ment within the framework of the third pillar runs along other lines to those 
in the first pillar. In the first place, it is not primarily directed at supporting 
EC law, but at combating serious crime (organised crime, terrorism, human 
trafficking et cetera) in the common area for freedom, security and justice. 
The support of the EC law by for instance the harmonisation of substan-
tive criminal law was and still is limited. In the second place, in the third 
pillar a more horizontal strategy is applied. Many initiatives are directed at 
cross-border criminal cooperation. It is striking for that matter that criminal 
procedural law hardly gets any attention in this connection. However, inter-
national cooperation is on the other hand strongly developed in the third 
pillar. Far-reaching cooperation exists by the exchange of information based 
on the principle of availability and the organisation of joint investigation 
teams in criminal investigations.0 
So, if we view the influencing of the law enforcement from the pillar 
structure, it may be stated that there is an influence both via the first pillar 
and via the third pillar, but that the ways of influencing in these pillars 
differ from each other. Moreover, it is striking that similar subjects – for 
instance cross-border cooperation – are dealt with in different ways in the 
two pillars. 
Nevertheless some converging trends are perceptible between the first 
and the third pillar. Within the first pillar the case law of the EC Court of 
Justice now already relates to the criminal law of a member state when it has 
chosen for criminal law enforcement. Moreover, since the ruling on environ-
mental criminal law in case C-76/03 and the ruling on discharges at sea in 
case C-0/05 the door seems to be open for prescribing criminal enforce-
ment in the first pillar, albeit that the scope of this power has been limited 
in the latter ruling. On the other hand, in some cases third-pillar legislation 
does not only concern criminal law, but also administrative law. This makes 
it clear that the two pillars grow towards each other and can influence each 
other. The consequences of this convergence between the first and the third 
pillar for the national law enforcement are noticeable. A substantial part 
of the law is now under European influence that is sometimes relatively 
far-reaching. That influence will in due course also become noticeable to an 
increasing degree at the level of criminal enforcement, in the same way as 
this has happened in respect of administrative enforcement.
	 6	 Dutch	Influence	on	EU	Enforcement	Provisions
For a proper perspective on the relation between EU legisla-
tion in the field of the law enforcement and national policy and legislation, 
in this respect it is also important to look at the possible influence which the 
member states exercise on the drafting of the European provisions. 
0  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 22.
94
adriaanse et al.
As far as the Netherlands is concerned, our research shows that the 
attitude of the Dutch government in respect of the various policy areas 
examined varies. That has obviously to do with the policy-field dependence 
previously mentioned and still to be discussed further hereinafter. There are 
nevertheless some remarkable developments which deserve to be pointed 
out. Sometimes, active Dutch attempts are made to influence European 
rules, for instance in the fields of combating terrorism, fish quota policy,2 
and customs.3 On the contrary, in other fields that does not happen. In 
those fields the Netherlands adopts a particularly passive attitude. In some 
fields the European agenda is used as a vehicle for the execution of national 
policy, e.g. in the field of media policy, in other fields one is especially busy 
defending one’s own freedom, as is apparent in the case studies concern-
ing combating terrorism,5 to a lesser extent also financial supervision,6 
and customs.7 In this respect the Netherlands seems to be fairly adept in 
defending its own position in the negotiations, whereby it applies, however, 
that the margins are often large enough in order to avoid problems in the 
implementation stage. Clear differences are perceptible as regards the contri-
bution of the Netherlands in the European legislative process and the role of 
the enforcement bodies in this respect. The role of the enforcement bodies is 
sometimes large, as in the field of financial supervision where consultations 
took place between the Ministry of Finance, the Authority for the Financial 
Markets, the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service/Economic Investi-
gation Service, the Ministry of Justice and the Public Prosecution Service.8 
Sometimes the role of the enforcement body is also almost absent. In the 
case of combating terrorism there has, in view of the time pressure, not been 
any contact with the Public Prosecution Service, the police and the bar.9 So 
in respect of the Dutch influence on the drafting of EU enforcement provi-
sions no clear line can be recognised. In this connection it must be noted 
that presently there still seems to be a reasonably large national freedom in 
organising law enforcement in the Netherlands. In many cases that goes 
hand in hand with the wish to keep it that way. With a view to this it is advis-
able to be alert, and if needed action must be taken. The foundations of the 
Dutch enforcement system are at present apparently such that the current 
European rules can be complied with without large adaptations of national 
law. However, this may change, now that in view of the ECJ rulings on 
  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 29.
2  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 27.
3  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 306.
  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 07.
5  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 28.
6  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 50.
7  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 308.
8  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 9.
9  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 25. 
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environmental criminal law and discharges at sea the Community legisla-
tor can also prescribe measures connected with criminal law, albeit that in 
this respect the nature and scope of the sanction to be imposed cannot be 
determined by the Community legislator. The parties concerned should be 
aware of this possibility and where needed adopt a (pro)active attitude, based 
among other things on experience with the enforcement practice in the 
Netherlands. Instead of examining which threat to national policy or law is 
posed by a concrete European instrument, the question should be in which 
areas the member states, and so also the Netherlands, need European guid-
ance when realising a common area of freedom, security and justice and, if 
this is the case, with which instruments. In particular this applies in order 
to avoid level playing field problems.
	 7	 	Implementation	Practice	in	the	Netherlands:	
Patterns	and	Problems
Our research has been carried out from the initial notion 
that, when the degree of Europeanization of the enforcement increases, 
the probability will also increase that European requirements will start to 
play a role in the implementation in a legal and actual sense (the execution 
of enforcement) in a policy area and that also deviations may start to arise. 
On the basis of a general analysis and research in eight case studies it has 
been observed that in areas with a low degree of Europeanization of the 
substantive rules there is hardly any influence on Dutch enforcement policy 
and enforcement practice. The enforcement in these files follows common, 
Dutch methods of organising enforcement. What is special about this is 
that in areas in which the degree of Europeanization of the substantive 
rules increases, and also where – still apart from that degree of Europeani-
zation – more and more directive European enforcement provisions occur, 
the national policy field and its characteristics are mostly the determining 
factor for explaining why the EU enforcement provisions have precisely been 
implemented in the way chosen. Within the framework of this research this 
is indicated as policy-field dependence. We see for instance a strong policy-
field dependence on the execution of EU enforcement provisions in the 
files of media policy, combating terrorism and air quality. As regards media 
policy it was notable that the existing more strict Dutch legislation resulted 
in a level playing field problem. In the case of combating terrorism we are 
faced with another objective other than the enforcement of European provi-
sions, namely national security. As regards air quality many decisions could 
not go ahead because of the coupling which has been made in the Dutch 
regulations between proper spatial planning and air quality requirements.50
50  This is also apparent from the article by P. Houweling & H. Luyendijk, ‘Implementatie 
zonder slot’ [2008/] RegelMaat, p. 5-20.
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In areas with a low degree of Europeanization we further observe that 
from the EU often only a number of general requirements for enforcement 
are set, which often also merge with the requirements which in the Nether-
lands are set for enforcement. This applies in particular for those files in 
which it is prescribed that fitting sanctions are taken, as long as they are 
effective, proportionate and deterrent, according to settled case law. It is then 
hardly possible to establish for these areas a further, deviating Dutch influ-
ence on the execution of these general European enforcement provisions, 
since to only a very limited extent the European enforcement provisions in 
question set a framework for, or give guidance to the Dutch enforcement 
practice. That makes it almost impossible to find differences. 
Where a strong influence of the national policy field on the manner of 
execution of EU enforcement provisions is at issue, we establish that the 
European influence is asymmetric. Where it would be expected that more 
Europeanization of the policy field and more European enforcement provi-
sions would also lead to a more perceptible European influence on the imple-
mentation, we arrive in our research at the conclusion that such a scheme is 
too simple. For instance, in areas with a greater degree of Europeanization of 
the enforcement there are more possibilities for deviations from the regime 
desired by the European Union. In our research we find this for instance 
in the case study on fish quota policy, where deviations are sometimes the 
consequence of the way in which the Netherlands has organised or inter-
preted the monitoring (for instance the Biesheuvel groups). In other cases 
a higher degree of Europeanization of the enforcement leads to an actual 
execution in which those EU rules are very expressly taken into account 
– sometimes more than strictly required. In such a case the Netherlands 
settles itself, so to speak, at the top of the band width. This is for instance 
at issue in the field of European competition, as already appeared from the 
aforementioned search powers of the Netherlands Competition Authority.
When considering possible patterns in the Dutch practice of implemen-
tation of EU enforcement provisions, both the practice of implementation 
from a legal and policy point of view and the actual implementation (the 
actual enforcement practice) have been examined. On the basis of leads 
in literature this research has focused on the following themes as regards 
the implementation from a legal and policy point of view: the necessity of 
implementation, the manner of legal implementation, the choice of the form 
of enforcement, transnational consultation and exchange of information and 
coordination in the implementation chain. In respect of the actual imple-
mentation (the actual enforcement practice) these themes are the follow-
ing: awareness of the authorities involved about the European origin of the 
rules to be enforced, possible enforcement priorities, the enforceability of 
European enforcement provisions and national provisions based on them, 
coordination in the enforcement chain, international consultations and 
information exchange, cooperation with European or foreign regulators, the 
enforcement capacity and second-line supervision.
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In view of the asymmetry of European influence and the strong policy-
field dependence – in spite of the existence of some points of resemblance 
– for none of these themes examined is it actually possible to speak of a 
single particular Dutch practice, or demonstrable usual patterns of execut-
ing EU enforcement provisions. 
With regard to possible problems in the implementation practice only 
some points for improvement – at European and/or national level – have 
been identified in some of the policy areas examined. For instance in the 
implementation stage lack of clarity may arise due to the fact that Brussels 
sometimes leaves two regulations in existence next to each other, without 
bringing them properly into line. An example of this is in the area of fish 
quota policy where a basic regulation and a monitoring regulation are left 
in existence next to each other.5 It also occurs that the consultations and 
information exchange about implementation of European rules in transna-
tional forums are arranged in an ad hoc way, this sometimes leads to prob-
lems. While those executing the rules organise themselves to an increasing 
degree in networks, national legislators turn out to have hardly any idea of 
the implementation choices that are made in Europe. Nevertheless practice 
has a strong need for information about the application of the European 
monitoring and sanction rules in other member states, as the case study 
on financial supervision shows.52 It also occurs that in the implementation 
stage there is little or no question of transnational consultations or informa-
tion exchange, such as in the field of air quality, while as a rule such consul-
tations are in fact experienced as being very positive in many areas. The 
coordination within the Dutch implementation chain does not always run 
very smoothly, as shows the case study on ESF.53 Sometimes there is even 
(virtually) no coordination, like in the fields of combating terrorism5 and air 
quality.55 It has also been established that the information exchange and the 
coordination in the enforcement chain sometimes appear to be a problem, 
as shows the case study on financial supervision.56 Another point of atten-
tion concerns the enforcement priorities to be set. When the enforcement 
of European rules prevails, it may put pressure on the enforcement of pure 
national rules, as is the case with customs.57 Furthermore, in many areas the 
risk of a level playing field problem has been observed.
Apart from these points for improvement, however, in the areas exam-
ined no structural problems in the practice of the implementation of Euro-
pean enforcement provisions appear to exist in the Netherlands, which is 
actually a gratifying final conclusion. 
5  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 257.
52  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 58.
53  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 25.
5  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 25.
55  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 82.
56  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 5.
57  P.C. Adriaanse et al., op. cit., p. 36.
